LIMA, OHIO
NEWS
NOV 30 1969
E - 41,779
S - 46,518

To Force Collaboration

'Hidden Secrets' Sought By Russian Spy Experts

By PAUL MANNING

NEW YORK (NANA) — Invasion of privacy and misuse of information is a charge leveled at credit bureaus throughout the country, which are well on the way toward a national computerized listing of man's failure to pay his bills promptly.

Yet U. S. credit bureaus must take a back seat to the high professionalism of "The Index:" one section of Russia's top secret KGB — Commissariat of State Security — which compiles the most detailed information on everyone in the world who might be of use at sometime or another to Soviet espionage.

Some 250 people, working on one floor in the compound of buildings near the Kremlin which houses Russia's "master" undercover agency, collect and file all information country by country.

This vast collection of biographies culled from foreign newspapers and magazines and supplemented by personal on-the-spot investigation (was that an FBI, CIA, or KGB check on you in your own hometown?) contains the usual information about parentage, place and date of birth, education and family.

A man's political views and affiliations are noted, along with his relationship with his employer, how much he earns, his debts, whether he is a good family man or a philanderer, if he drinks and how much, is his wife an asset or a liability to his career — which generally is what a U. S. corporation likes to know about its executive material.

But the Soviets dig even deeper and when they uncover hidden secrets they feel they've struck pay dirt. The main object of their personnel investigation is to discover weaknesses as well as strengths in a man, since weaknesses — homosexuality, indiscreet sex, high living beyond income, extreme emotion under strain, suicidal tendencies — can be played upon and developed into blackmail situations to induce collaboration.

Understandably, CIA employes also come under surveillance by "The Index" section. Some CIA agents who have spent long, arduous periods in odd corners of the globe are apt to suffer from "motivational exhaustion" and become targets for penetration and collaboration. A few commite suicide. One case of record was the 32-year-old CIA employe, James A. Woodbury, and his wife just back from Germany who jumped into the Potomac rapids in a suicide pact on October, 1959.

The CIA man drowned but his wife was pulled out. She told the Washington police that her husband had much on his mind, and "they wanted to put him in a psycho ward and we figured it best to do away with ourselves."

The mountain of material gathered by "The Index" section of KGB has now been computerized. When a Soviet director wants specific data on a man, he feeds key words into an electronic brain and within five seconds a microfilmed document complete with photograph appears on a viewing machine. Punch cards and computer have brought order out of chaos in the Soviet filing section, as it has in Langley, Va., where CIA headquarters has similar information stored in its memory banks.

A resident director commanding a spy network in the field for either KGB or the CIA can request the latest information on a man or woman and receive it from Moscow or Washington by high speed radio transmission within 20 seconds.

While such informational output is almost instantaneous, the imput is slow and laborious.

Harry Gold, who served the Russians for 11 years, including his most noteworthy assignment of courier for the Rosenberg - Klaus Fuchs atomic spy ring, complained of the personnel data he was required to dredge up when not on important assignments. It was not a happy, glamorous life as he described it:

"It is nothing but dreary drudgery trying to get information. Sometimes you are unsuccessful. You spend long hours waiting on street corners, waiting dubiously and fearfully in strange towns where I had no business to be, and the uneasy killing of time in cheap movies, gazing unin movies, gazing unseeingly seeingly at the screen."

The KGB Center in Moscow keeps close tabs on all its agents. While it employs thousands of natives of each country, they are not highly regarded in Moscow. And while the native - born Communist vacuums up all sorts of odd information for "The Index" in Moscow, it is the illegal residents or principal agents trained at home and sent outside who form the backbone of Soviet espionage. These are the well educated, the highly disciplined, the young unmarried men who are selected with care and sometimes trained for years before being sent under deep cover to their foreign assignment.

One senior U. S. official in counter - intelligence said. "Illegals now form the bigger part of Soviet intelligence. and few governments realize how serious and extensive this apparatus has become."

Yet even among Russia's home-trained agents there are defections to the CIA. Generally, these are due to weariness with the clandestine life, the ever-present fear of detection, irritation with the bureaucracy of the Soviet intelligence apparatus and the softening influence of life in the West.

Some defect or become intelligence agents for the West because of ideological reasons. Oleg Penkovskly, a key member of the Soviet intelligence service who occupied a position of great trust, turned traitor to his country because of disillusionment, and fed information of the greatest importance to Britain and the CIA until he was uncovered and shot to death in the spring of 1963.

Others never defect, and continue to serve their time as agents until re-assigned home or are discovered by the FBI. Col. Rudolf Abel,

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